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LIFE STYLE, HEALTH STATUS,
AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Robert L. Schwartzt
ONLY A FEW years ago the American system for providing
health care was considered rather benign - an inevitable conse-
quence of American values. Over the past few years, however, the
increased amount of our resources allocated to health care - now
about fourteen percent of the gross domestic product1 - and the
consistently high levels of those people not covered by even that
very high expenditure - fifteen percent across the United States,
and up to twenty-five percent in some states2 - have made the sys-
tem simply unacceptable. To put it simply, the cost of health care
and the widespread lack of access to it have become a national
t Professor of Law, University of New Mexico. B.A., Stanford University; J.D.
Harvard School of Law. The author appreciates the commentary and editorial assistance
offered by Pam Lambert, Margaret Caffey-Moquin, Karen Kingen and Jessica Sutin.
1. George D. Lundberg, National Health Care Reform: The Aura of Inevitability Inten-
sifies, 267 JAMA 2521, 2522 fig. 2 (1992). This is a remarkable increase over the 12% figure
for the previous year. See E. BROWN, HEALTH USA: A NATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAM FOR
THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 1991 UNITED STATES INDUSTRIAL
OUTLOOK 44-1-11-6 (1991). Dr Lundberg, editor of the Journal of the American Medical
Association, views the increase in the resources spent on health care as an "extreme" that is
"unacceptable". Lundberg, supra at 2522. The amount of our national resources spent on
health care has increased regularly and substantially over the past forty years.
National expenditures on health care have increased from $12.7 billion in 1950 to
$41.9 billion in 1965 to $647 billion in 1990. Per capita spending on medical care
has grown from $82 per year in 1950 to $211 in 1965 to $2511 in 1990... Between
1980 and 1988, the medical care component of the consumer price index increased
85% compared to a general increase of inflation of 43% ... Americans spend more
on health care than they spend on groceries, owner-occupied housing, or
transportation.
BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 661 (2d ed. 1991).
2. Medicaid, which is the primary program designed to cover the poor, covers fewer
than half of the people under the federal poverty line. FURROW ET AL., supra note 1, at 529.
See also, Geraldine Dallek, Health Care for America's Poor. Separate and Unequal, 20
CLEARINGHOUSE Rav. 361 (1986). New Mexico, the state with the highest percentage of its
population without any form of private or public coverage, only recently brought that per-
centage down to one-fourth of its residents. GOVERNOR'S HEALTH POLICY ADVISORY COM-
MiTTEE, HEALTH FOR THE FUTURE: A PROPOSED HEALTH POLICY FOR NEW MEXICO 9
(1988). See also, KATHLEEN BROOK ET AL., HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN NEW
MEXICO 10 (1991). When the underinsured are added to the uncovered, the number may rise
to one-fourth the population of the entire country. Pamela J. Farley, Who are the Underin-
sured?, 63 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 476 (1985).
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scandal.3
As this scandal has unfolded, we have reacted to it just as we
react to most other scandals that manifest themselves during polit-
ical years; we have begun our search for scapegoats. Indeed, we
have rounded up the usual suspects - some people blame the
problems on insurance companies4, others blame the problem on
lawyers and the legal system5, still others blame the problem on
greedy, profit driven private enterprise and the existence of the mar-
ket mechanism for the delivery of health care6, and yet others blame
it on bureaucratic government regulation of that market.7 Doctors,
3. With the American Medical Association and the American Hospital Association
joining virtually every other national organization that deals with health care financing in
calling for dramatic health care reform, it is hard to find any support for the current struc-
ture. Presidential candidates are fighting with each other over the structure that ought to
replace the current financing system, but there is no disagreement that the current system
provides inadequate access at excessive cost. The only question is which kind of substantial
change will be most effective. As Dr. Lundberg points out:
At least 57 national and state legislative proposals for health care reform have been
filed; major components of the Republican and Democratic platforms will deal with
health care reform. Presidential contenders have already developed their postures
regarding health care reform... With President Bush having entered the discus-
sion, the reality of reform seems assured. The only questions now are what, how
much, how soon, how incremental, how complete, how effective, and how long-
lasting.
Lundberg, supra note 1, at 2521. He suggests that "[m]ajor political change in a democratic
republic such as ours comes about when a cluster of forces temporally coalesces to form a
critical political mass of sufficient strength to power that change," something that has now
happened with our health care system. Id. See also Robert J. Blendon et al., Making the
Critical Choices, 267 JAMA 2509 (1992) (discussing substantive questions that must be ad-
dressed by any new system).
4. See, eg., Kevin Grumbach et al., Liberal Benefits, Conservative Spending: The Phy-
sicians for a National Health Program Proposal, 265 JAMA 2549 (1991).
5. Not surprisingly, this is a central part of the American Medical Association's entry
into the health care reform sweepstakes. See James A. Todd et al., Health Access America -
Strengthening the US Health Care System, 265 JAMA 2503 (1991) (reviewing problems with
current insurance availability in the United States and proposing reforms to improve access
and quality of health care). Limited access to health care is also one of the myriad of social
ills that President Bush blames on lawyers and the legal system. GEORGE BUSH, THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH REFORM PROGRAM 50 (1992).
6. See e.g., Rand E. Rosenblatt, Health Care, Markets; and Democratic Values, 34
VAND. L. REV. 1067 (1981); Bruce C. Vladeck, The Market vs. Regulation: The Case for
Regulation, 59 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 209 (1981); and Robert G. Evans, Tension,
Compression, and Shear. Directions, Stresses and Outcomes of Health Care Cost Control, 15 J.
HEALTH POL., PoL'Y & L. 101 (1990). See also Arnold S. Reiman, What Markets Are Doing
to Medicine, ATLANTIc MONTHLY 98, 106 (1992) (warning that "if physicians continue to
allow themselves to be drawn along the path of private entrepreneurship, they will increas-
ingly be seen as self-interested businessmen and will lose many of the privileges they now
enjoy as fiduciaries and trusted professionals").
7. See eg., James F. Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources: A Constitutional, Legal
and Policy Analysis, 59 TEx. L. REv. 1345 (1981) and James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan,
Redefining Government's Role in Health Care: Is a Dose of Competition What the Doctor
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medical schools, hospitals, drug companies - all have been alleged
to be culpable for the scandal of our health care system.
The newest and most original scapegoat upon which we can
place the blame for the high cost of health care are those whose life
style choices puts their health or lives at risk. Of course, if our
health care cost and access problems are a consequence of un-
healthy choices made by autonomous individuals, we are relieved of
the obligation of figuring out how to reform our health care delivery
system. In that case, the solution to our health care problem is ob-
vious - we merely need to impose appropriate penalties on those
who make costly, immoral and unhealthy life style choices.
The call for some kind of mechanism that would make people
pay for the health consequences of their life style choices is coming
from a variety of sources. Some physicians have announced that
they will automatically reject alcoholic liver transplant candidates,
or put them lower on the priority list, because their moral fault -
their alcoholism - caused them to need the transplant.' At least
one state has attempted to deny Medicaid funding for liver trans-
plants for former alcoholics unless they can prove abstinence for at
least two years prior to the transplant.9
Employers are cashing in on this trend as a way to save insur-
ance dollars. For example, Circle K stores proposed denying cover-
age for all employee health claims resulting from self-induced
conditions; they would deny coverage for the results of drug or al-
cohol abuse, self-inflicted wounds, and AIDS (unless it can be
proven that it was acquired by transfusion). 10 Several employers
pay larger motor vehicle accident death benefits to an employee's
family if the employee was wearing a seat belt during the fatal acci-
dent." Some companies charge employees who smoke more than
other employees to participate in their group health plan;12 Turner
Should Order? 34 VAND. L. REV. 849, 852 (1981). See also CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, DER-
EGULATING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY: PLANNING FOR COMPETITION (1982).
8. Gregory Tetrault, The Morality of Transplantation, 266 JAMA 213 (1991). See also
Carl Cohen & Martin Benjamin, Alcoholics and Liver Transplantation, 265 JAMA 1299
(1991).
9. Allen v. Mansour, 681 F. Supp. 1232 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
10. See George Will, Who Should Insure Our Lifestyle Choices?, WASH. POST, Aug. 11,
1988, at A21 (discussing policy to deny employee coverage for certain ailments). Also see,
Jaime Fernandez, The Folly of Basing Health Insurance on "Lifestyle Choices'; WASH. POST,
Aug. 20, 1988, at A21 (responding to the article by George Will).
11. Laurie Cohen, Wanted: Healthier Workers; More Companies Give Rewards for Stay-
ing Well, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 6, 1992, at Bl.
12. Id.
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Broadcasting refuses to hire any employee who smokes;13 and the
United States Senate has considered a Medicare Part B premium
surcharge for smokers. 4 Haggar Apparel Company pays only 60%
of the cost of prenatal care (rather that the 100% otherwise stan-
dard) if the pregnant employee or family member delays seeking
prenatal medical care after she becomes aware of her pregnancy.' 5
The state of Delaware plans to implement a scheme later this year
under which it would charge unhealthy state employees more for
group health insurance than it charges other employees. 16
The courts have already confronted some of these attempts to
hold individuals responsible for their health status. Turner Broad-
casting has not been required to hire smokers. 7 Michigan may not
impose a two year sobriety rule to refuse liver transplants to Medi-
caid patients who were alcoholics. All Medicaid recipients must be
treated on the basis of medical necessity.' 8 Other attempts to make
patients, employees, aid recipients, and the insured financially re-
sponsible for their medical conditions or to deny them care for these
conditions altogether are certainly bound for Congress, state legisla-
tures, the courts, and union-management negotiation tables.
I. THE RANGE OF LIFE STYLE CHOICES AND THEIR
CONSEQUENCES ON HEALTH STATUS
If all of those whose life style choices have health consequences
were required to bear the full burden of those consequences, there
would be few of us (and few diseases or injuries) that would not be
implicated. While the medical hazards of smoking and alcohol con-
sumption are well known, 19 the medical consequences of other
kinds of action are less established or less obvious. Helmetless mo-
13. Dan Cordtz, For Our Own Good, FIN. WORLD, Dec. 10, 1991, at 48.
14. David Durenburger, Financing Health Care for an Aging Population, WASH. POST,
April 14, 1987, at Z14.
15. Cordtz, supra note 13.
16. Cohen, supra note 11.
17. Christine Woolsey, Off-duty Conduct: None of the Employer's Business?, Bus. INS.,
Feb. 17, 1992, at 10.
18. Allen v. Mansour, 681 F. Supp. 1232 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
19. The Office of Technology Assessment estimates the cost of smoking in the United
States at over $65 billion per year, with $22 billion attributable to health care costs and $43
billion attributable to lost productivity. For an analysis of the costs of alcohol to society see
William R. Miller, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT MODALrrIEs: TEs-
TIMONY TO THE U.S. SENATE COMMrITEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, in 2 CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES OF ALCOHOL ABUSE 158 (1989). Willard G. Manning et al., The
Taxes of Sin: Do Smokers and Drinkers Pay Their Way?, 261 JAMA 1604 (1989) (discussing
the consequences of smoking and alcohol use and their costs for society).
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torcyclists2° and bicyclists2" and drivers who do not wear seat belts
put their lives at risk;2 2 obese and sedentary people put their health
at risk.2 3 Those who consume excess fat or insufficient fiber have
increased risk of some kinds of cancers24 (and, possibly, heart dis-
ease). Even former President Bush risks some kinds of cancer when
he refuses his broccoli. On the other hand, those who eat too many
carbohydrates run the risk of the most common disease, dental cavi-
ties.2" Those who engage in unprotected sex run the risk of several
different illnesses;2 6 those who engage in protected sex run risks
from certain types of protection;27 those who engage in no sexual
20. Allen Short, Collision Course; State Must Pass Helmet Law for Motorcyclists or Face
Funding Cut, MmN. STAR TRIB., Mar. 1, 1992, at Al (citing estimates by the General Ac-
counting Office that indicate that motorcycle riders with helmets have fatality rates as much
as 70% lower than those without helmets).
21. According to one study done at Allegheny General Hospital in Pittsburgh, 50,000
children were injured in bicycle-related accidents in 1990, and over 1,000 died. Eighty five
percent of the injuries could have been avoided through the use of bicycle helmets. Asides
and Insides in Healthcare, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 8, 1991, at 44. See also Robert Thompson et al.,
A Case - Control Study of the Effectiveness of Bicycle Safety Helmets, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1361 (1989). See generally, A JONES ET AL., COST OF INJURY IN THE UNrrED STATES; A
REPORT TO CONGRESS 115-16 (1989).
22. The Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board has estimated that
18,087 lives were saved in 1990 as a direct result of mandatory seat belt laws. See Bill McAl-
lister & Evelyn Richards, Nine States Targeted on Seat Belt Laws, WASH. POST, Sept. 20,
1991, at A25.
23. See W.B. Kannel & Tavia Gordon, Physiological and Medical Concommitants of
Obesity: The Framingham Study, reprinted in OBESITY IN AMERICA 125 (George A. Bray,
ed., 1979).
24. The increased risk is not just the risk of colon cancer, a risk that is fairly well
known. See Kara Smigel, Fewer Colon Polyps Found in Men with High-Fiber, Law-Fat Diets,
84 J. NAT. CANCER INST. 80 (1992). There is an association between saturated animal fats
and breast cancer, too. See David P. Rose, Effect of Dietary Fat on Human Breast Cancer
Growth and Lung Metastasis in Nude Mice, 83 J. NAT. CANCER INST. 1491 (1991). See also
David P. Rose, LIPIDS, OBESITY AND FEMALE REPRODUCTIVE CANCER, in LIPIDS AND
WOMEN'S HEALTH (Geoffrey P. Redmond, ed., 1991). David I. Gregorio et al., Dietary Fat
Consumption and Survival Among Women with Breast Cancer, 75 J. NAT. CANCER INST. 37
(1985).
25. See Rosie Schwartz, It's Time To Put A Stop to Sugar-Filled Breakfasts, OTTAWA
CITIZEN, March 11, 1992, at E2.
26. The Centers for Disease Control reports that 11,609 people have contracted AIDS
through heterosexual contact. The number who contracted it this way in 1990 (2,289) is up
30% from those who contracted it by heterosexual contact in 1989. In addition, the Execu-
tive Director of the American Social Health Association reports that 12 million new sexually
transmitted disease cases are reported each year. See Beth Sherman, Its A Scary New World
for Those Re-Entering the Dating Scene after Divorce or Death of A Spouse, NEWSDAY, Jan.
25, 1992, at 17.
27. See Sharon Snider, The Pill- Thirty Years of Safety Concerns, 24 FDA CONSUMER
8, 10 (1990). See also Robert Stein, Spermicides Linked to Urinary Tract Infections, UNITED
PRESS INT'L, Jan. 2 1991., and Ridgley Ochs, The Latest in Birth Control Methods, Research-
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activity may run yet another set of physical, emotional, and psycho-
logical risks.
People who choose to live far enough away from where they
work or shop so that they have to drive to those sites substantially
increase their chance of death or serious bodily injury in an automo-
bile accident. Those who choose to work as miners or police officers
or loggers run a greater risk of violent or accidental death than do
the rest of us.28 Although being unemployed also substantially
shortens ones life expectancy. 29 Those who participate in certain
sports (including skiing, boxing, hang gliding, and statistics suggest,
baseball and football) risk severe injury.30
People who do not become vaccinated against measles are at
ers Reliable, Safe Forms on the Market, NEWSDAY (Nassua and Suffolk), Apr. 28, 1992, at
61.
28. See RuTH GAS=L, OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE: INSURANCE IssuEs (1992) (discuss-
ing generally occupational illnesses).
29. Harold Gilliam, Mend Your Ways or Count Your Days, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON.,
June 9, 1991, at 13/Z1. Not surprisingly, health is also closely related to homelessness; the
indigent homeless are worse off than the indigent with homes. See Lillian Gelberg et a.,
Health, Homelessness and Poverty; A Study of Clinic Users, 150 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
2325 (1990).
30. Data from the National Athletic Injury-Illness Reporting System indicate that most
drownings, many firearm fatalities, 10% of brain injuries, 7% of spinal cord injuries, and
13% of facial injuries are related to sports. Susan G. Gererich, Sports Injuries Implications
for Prevention, 100 PuB. HEALTH REP. 570 (1985). A Vermont study on cross-country ski-
ing revealed an injury rate of 0.72 per 1000 skier days. Per Renstrom & Robert J. Johnson, 8
SPORTS MED. (6) 346 (1989). A study of elite Alpine skiers in Quebec estimated the injury
rate at 17 per 1000 skier days. Ross E. Anderson & David L. Montgomery, Physiology of
Alpine Skiing, 6 SPORTS MED. 4, at 210 (1988). A recent estimate ranked boxing fatality
rates (about 0.13 deaths per 1000 participants annually) at or less than those for hang gliding.
Robert G. Morrison, Medical and Public Health Aspects of Boxing, 255 JAMA 2475 (1986).
A study conducted among high school athletes participating in male football, baseball, and
soccer, and female basketball and track and field, reported injuries to 39.5% of the partici-
pants. R. Durant et al., Findings from the Preparticipation Athletic Examination and Athletic
Injuries, 146 Am. J. DISABLED CHILDREN 85 (1992). On the other hand, rule changes in
football, together with better training and coaching techniques, reduced the occurrence of
permanent cervical quadriplegia from 34 in 1976 to 5 in 1984. Joseph S. Tong et al., The
National Football Head and Neck Injury Registry; 14-Year Report on Cervical Quadriplegia,
1971 Through 1984, 254 JAMA 3439 (1985). Running, a sport widely engaged in for its
fitness benefits, poses risks, although generally of a less serious nature. A study of 1,680
runners in two community road race events in Canada reported that 48% of the participants
experienced at least one injury during the 12-month follow-up period; 54% of those injuries
were new. Stephan D. Walter, The Ontario Cohort Study of Running-Related Injuries, 149
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2561 (1989).
All of the dangers of these athletic endeavors are exacerbated when the athletes look for a
competitive advantage through the use of medicine. See Virginia S. Cowart, Ethical, as Well
as Physiological, Questions Continue to Arise Over Athlete's Steroid Abuse, 261 JAMA 3362
(1989).
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risk for that disease, 31 and those who forego their winter flu shots
put themselves at greater risk of that sometimes fatal disease.32
Those who allow themselves to live with high blood pressure put
themselves at risk for a whole range of diseases. 3 Those who do
not participate in a symptomatic screening for breast cancer, colon
cancer, lung cancer, heart disease and other diseases are at greater
risk of death from those diseases.
Poverty is a lifestyle with adverse health consequences. 34 Those
who are poor are at much higher risk of illness than those who are
rich. Those who choose to live in Chicago or New York City rather
than Minneapolis or Salt Lake City are also choosing a life style
that, according to statistics, is likely to result in a shorter life.35
The rich variety of life style choices for which individuals may
bear moral responsibility and the various health consequences of
those choices suggest that no analysis of the propriety of imposing
that responsibility may apply to every person or every condition.
Some relevant life style choices involve health care decision making;
some involve career choices; some involve leisure time choices.
Should we treat the responsibility that accompanies these different
31. The Centers for Disease Control reported 27,672 measles cases in the United States
in 1990, a 52.1% increase over the incidence reported for 1989. Among the 1990 cases were
89 suspected measles-associated deaths. Division of Immunization, Center for Prevention
Services, Centers for Disease Control, Measles - United States, 1990, 265 JAMA 3227
(1990). In 1983, the disease reached its nadir in the United States with 1,497 cases. The
dramatic rise in incidence has been attributed to a failure to vaccinate. Laura L. Fisher & R.
Gordon Douglas, Infectious Diseases, 265 JAMA 3130, 3131 (1991).
32. Annual deaths from influenza and its complications range from 20,000 to 40,000; yet
only 30% to 40% of high-risk people are vaccinated each year. Kristin L. Nichol et a.,
Influenza Vaccination; Knowledge, Attitudes, and Behavior Among High-Risk Outpatients,
152 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 106 (1992).
33. Hypertension (high blood pressure) currently places about 58 million Americans at
increased risk for stroke, heart disease, and kidney failure. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report, Centers for Disease Control, Progress Toward Achieving the 1990 High Blood Pres-
sure Objectives, 264 JAMA 2192 (1990).
34. See Gelberg et al., supra note 29, at 2325. Poverty appears to be one of the primary
reasons African Americans are at a higher risk for cancer than Whites. See Suzanne P.
Kelley, Blacks at Higher Risk for Cancer; Myths, Mistrust and Poverty Are Among Factors,
STAR TRIB., Dec. 8, 1991, at Bl.
35. This increase in longevity is thought to be due, in part, to the high proportion of
Mormons in the population of Utah. Because of their abstinence from tobacco, alcohol and
caffeine, together with good general health practices, active Mormons have been recognized
as a population at very low risk for cancer. James E. Enstrom, Cancer Mortality Among
Mormons, 36 CANCER INST. 805 (1975). See also James E. Enstrom, Health Practices and
Cancer Mortality Among Active California Mormons, 81 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1807
(1989). Actually, the states with the longest average life spans are Minnesota and The
Dakotas; Nevada (which also has a large Mormon population) has the shortest average life
span. See Gilliam, supra note 29, at 13.
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kinds of decisions differently? Is there more culpability attached to
a leisure time choice that to an employment choice? Is there more
culpability in making an "unhealthy" work choice than in making a
risky decision about medical treatment?
To determine when, if ever, it might be appropriate to make
someone pay for her self-induced health status, we should deter-
mine what the reasons for imposing such a responsibility could ever
be.
II. ARE INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR
HEALTH STATUS?
The idea that one is responsible for one's own health status is
not new. It is recognized in virtually every form of ancient
medicine, and it provides the basis of many systems of folk
medicine.36 For centuries people have believed that illness is a form
of divine retribution, and that the unworthy are proven so by their
disease state.37 This historical approach is reflected in the current
belief that "clean living" is the way to health (and, thus, ill health
must be the consequence of unclean living).38 If you are sick, it is
likely to be because you deserve it. You got your cold, just as your
36. See Erik Eckholm, AIDS and Folk Healing, a Zimbabwe Encounter, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 1990, at AI0 (describing one current example where the belief that one is responsible
for personal health is present in folk medicine).
37. See Peter Sedgwick, Illness - Mental and Otherwise in CONCEPTS OF HEALTH
AND DISEASE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 119, 125-26 (Arthur Caplan et al. eds.,
1981). As Sedgwick points out, "[i]n a society where the treatment of the sick is still con-
ducted through religious ritual, the notion of illness will not be entirely distinct from the
notion of sinfulness or pollution." Id at 126. See also Henry Cohen, The Evolution of the
Concept of Disease, in CONCEPTS OF HEALTH AND DISEASE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPEC-
TIVES 209 (Arthur Caplan et al. eds., 1981).
38. Indeed, this twentieth century phenomenon is remarkably similar to nineteenth cen-
tury developments. Presbyterian minister Sylvester Graham's mid-nineteenth century no-
tions that we should avoid alcohol, meat, and overly refined grains - and that spiritual
health is necessarily closely related to physical health - is reflected in the current interest in
"natural" foods, even if the nineteenth century Christianity that provided the underpinning
to Rev. Graham's theory is now replaced by a more general and less sectarian notion of
spirituality. The cracker invented by Rev. Graham has its analogue in the shelves of whole
grain crackers now available in the natural food stores. His spiritual and physical Puritanism
also touched off a conviction to "biological living" in nineteenth century cereal magnates
John Harvey Kellogg and C. W. Post, who espoused and expanded Graham's principles
through writing, lecturing, and product development.
For a more thorough account of the relationship between religious movements and health
movements in the nineteenth century, see James C. Whorton, Traditions of Folk Medicine in
America, 257 JAMA 1632 (1987); JAMES C. WHORTON, CRUSADERS FOR FITNESS: THE
HISTORY OF AMERICAN HEALTH REFORMERS (1982); and STEPHEN NISSENBAUM, SEX,
DIET, AND DEBILrrY IN JACKSONIAN AMERICA (1980). Indeed, the anti-medicine culmina-
tion of the nineteenth century "do it naturally" movement - Christian Science - may have
202 [Vol. 3:195
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mother promised, because you walked out in the rain without a
warm coat and rubbers, which, your mother assured you, was a
moral failing. Radio talk shows hosts and their callers all know
exactly which kinds of people have AIDS, and what kinds of im-
moral conduct gave rise to their affliction.
Are those who need medical care because of their moral choices
less deserving of our health care resources than others? There are
three ways that those who have made "unhealthy" choices could be
required to bear the burdens of those choices. Those with "un-
healthy" life styles could be denied health care (for the conditions
their improper conduct abetted, or for all conditions); they could be
given lower priority for scarce health care resources than those
whose need is independent of their conduct; or they could be
charged comparatively more than deserving others for their health
care (either at the point of the health care services, or earlier
through higher insurance premiums or additional taxes).
Whatever burden might be attached to "unhealthy" conduct is
generally justified on three grounds. First, the additional burden
deters others from making the same improper life style choices.
Second, the burden appropriately punishes the morally wrongful
conduct. Third, it is not equitable to distribute scarce health care
resources to those who choose to create health risks (and who thus
could choose to avoid them).3 9 Each of these propositions is based
on three presumptions; first, that the life style in question is truly
voluntary; second, that the life style actually brought about the con-
dition that now demands treatment; and third, that the life style is
not warranted by other countervailing social interests. In fact, in
most cases the voluntariness, causation and countervailing social in-
terest elements are subject to a great many uncertainties.
III. VOLUNTARINESS
Before imposing any burden on those life style choices which
result in the need for medical care, one must be sure that the life
style choices are truly voluntary. It is impossible to deter conduct
its equivalent in the mistrust of medicine that seems to underlie the current interest in "natu-
ral" foods.
39. A fourth justification, that of efficiency, suggests that imposing the risk on one who
can control it is the cheapest way of reducing that risk. In fact, this justification is really a
combination of the justifications based on deterrence and the equitable distribution of scarce
resources. For an excellent discussion of each of these justifications, and for the best analysis
of how voluntary health risks might be considered by public policy, see Gerald Dworkin,
Taking Risks, Assessing Responsibilities, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1981, at 26. Much of
the organization of this article is drawn from Professor Dworkin's excellent analysis.
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that isn't within a person's control by imposing sanctions on that
conduct; aging, for example, cannot be deterred by threats of pun-
ishment. No one would suggest that retributive justice permits the
imposition of a punishment on one whose conduct was involuntary.
Punishment requires moral responsibility, and moral responsibility
is premised upon free will. Finally, principles of distributive justice
require that people in like situations be treated in like ways. Two
patients with identical medical conditions, each the consequence of
a process beyond the patient's control, are in like situations with
regard to their medical needs.
There are, however, few conditions that are purely voluntary.
The choice to take a drink appears to be voluntary, but alcoholism,
we know, is a product of several forces. Alcoholism does not occur
in a vacuum. There is a genetic component, which may be race
linked.' There certainly is a social component, and the alcohol use
patterns of an alcoholic's family seem to have a substantial effect on
the chances that one will become an alcoholic.41 There is also a
gender component of alcohol related diseases.42 Alcoholism is
more likely to lead to cirrhosis in women than in men, and any
decision not to provide liver transplants to alcoholics will dispro-
portionately impact women.43
Indeed, it is hard to find a life style "choice" or a health condi-
tion that is not, at least in part, a consequence of genetics, family
environment, social environment, gender, life trauma, ethnicity,
community, education (and, especially, health education) and,
probably, most significantly, wealth. As one union official pointed
out when his employer proposed a life style health insurance pre-
mium differential, the rich and the poor have different ways of deal-
ing with stress. The rich may choose an occasional weekend in
Barbados or on the slopes; the poor are more likely to choose "a six-
pack and a smoke".' Is an impoverished person's choice to live in
a poor neighborhood, miles away from the new suburban job belts,
a voluntary act? Are the risks that arise from the eating habits of
someone who has never been taught about the consequences of con-
suming fats, and who does not know what a complex carbohydrate
40. Cohen & Benjamin, supra note 8, at 1299.
41. See Miller, supra note 19.
42. Cohen & Benjamin, supra note 8.
43. Id. M. Berglund, Mortality and Alcoholics Related to Clinical State at First Admis-
sion A Study of 537 Deaths, 70 AcTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 407, 415 (1984).
44. See Cohen, supra note 11, at CI (quoting Vance Sulsky, Chief Negotiator in New-
castle for the Delaware Public Employees Council 81 of the American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees).
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is, voluntarily undertaken? Is a coal miner who knows no other
way of feeding his family making a voluntary choice when he de-
cides to go down into the mine? Is one who has become addicted to
drugs or alcohol (or food or sex, for that matter) acting voluntarily
while satisfying that addiction?
Obviously, there is some voluntary element to each of these
kinds of conduct. Some kinds of conduct are more clearly the con-
sequence of free choice than are others; arguably the failure to wear
seat belts after a company-wide seat belt campaign is a truly volun-
tary act. Most life style choices, though, are the consequences of a
variety of factors, and most commonly we do not know the signifi-
cance of the different factors. The problem is not that we have yet
to research the genetic, social, or family influences on alcoholism,
for example, it is that we do not know the relative consequences of
those influences despite our research. We do know that most life
style choices - including those that have adverse health conse-
quences - are the result of more than a series of simple voluntary
choices.
IV. CAUSATION
One is responsible for one's health status only if it is actually
(and perhaps approximately) caused by one's voluntary conduct.
However, while it is possible to define general risks from identifiable
kinds of conduct, it is difficult to draw a direct link between an
example of that conduct and a particular health consequence. 45 We
know that the use of seat belts generally decreases the risk of death
in automobile accidents, but it is not so easy to determine that the
use of a seat belt in a particular accident would save the life of the
driver.46 While we know of the connection between lack of exercise
and heart disease, we also know that hundreds of thousands of
physically fit people die of heart disease each year while hundred of
thousands of the unfit live.47 It is usually impossible to trace an
individual's death to that individual's exercise habits. While homo-
sexual sex carries with it a risk of HIV, so does heterosexual sex.48
45. For an excellent discussion of the relationship between causation, voluntariness, and
moral responsibility in this arena, see Dworkin, supra note 39.
46. While the National Transportation Safety Board says that 18,087 lives were saved in
1990 because of mandatory seat belt laws, no one can determine precisely who was saved
because of the existence of those laws. See McAllister, supra note 22, at A25.
47. Indeed, some of the generally encouraged "healthy" behaviors appear to have no
effect on some kinds of risks. See I-Min Lee et al., Physical Activity and the Risk of Develop-
ing Colorectal Cancer Among College Alumni, 83 J. NAT'L CANCER INsr. 1324 (1991).
48. See Sherman, supra note 26, at 17.
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We can say that having seven lottery tickets gives you a better
chance to win than having only one; it is harder to say that someone
won the lottery because she bought seven tickets. Similarly, while
we can define conduct that increases the risk of illness or injury
(and we all engage in a variety of conduct that does so in many
different ways), it remains very difficult to conclude that an identifi-
able health event was actually caused by a life style choice.
V. COUNTERVAILING SOCIAL INTEREST
Even where voluntary conduct relates in a causally proximate
way resulting in an adverse health consequence, society may wish to
encourage that arguably dangerous conduct. In some cases the jus-
tification for such conduct is quite obvious; we want soldiers, police
officers, firefighters and others to undertake those occupations even
though they face danger when they do so. Some justifications are
less apparent, however. We acknowledge the talents of daredevil
stunt artists, NFL tackles, and great boxers because of the pleasure
those entertainers bring to the entire society; it is worth it for all of
us for those with particular skills to undertake those health risks.
While driving across town to work is more dangerous than
walking down the street to work, there is a social value in being able
to choose your place of work and being able to maintain your home
community and neighborhood even when you change your place of
work. This social value may be a countervailing social interest that
justifies the substantial voluntary health risks undertaken by
commuters.
For many kinds of social justifications, the quality of the alleg-
edly countervailing social interest is a matter of real and intense
social debate. The first African Americans who risked integrating
their schools also faced physical danger to themselves. This volun-
tarily undertaken risk is justified and appropriately applauded by
our society. Civil rights workers in the 1960s faced real health risks
when they marched in the South; we now think of those risks as
justified by the nature of their cause and the ultimate outcome of
their endeavors. Will we feel that way about others who now risk
their own safety to demonstrate, for example, in support of the right
to life or the right to choose?
How are we to treat the person who refuses to wear a seat belt
because he views it as an inappropriate intrusion by government
into his private realm of decision making? How are we to evaluate
the motorcyclist who does not wear a helmet as a matter of political
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expression - as a part of the Hell's Angels uniform, for example?4 9
While smoking, eating "unhealthy" foods, playing high risk sports,
and participating in identifiable social activities are all leisure life-
style choices, they also may have expressive political content. It is
difficult to determine the appropriate level of generality upon which
we would base a justification for voluntarily undertaking health
risks.
Consequently, it is not easy to determine whether particular vol-
untary conduct which actually causes an adverse health result is
justified on the basis of principles important to the rest of society.
VI. ARGUMENTS FOR ASSESSING INDIVIDUAL
RESPONSIBILITIES
A. Deterrence
One argument for denying coverage for health care that is
caused by voluntary conduct, or for charging more for such health
care, is to deter undesirable conduct. We may wish to deter the
conduct because it is costly or unpleasant for the one engaging in
the conduct or her family. If someone knows that he will be denied
treatment for lung cancer if he smokes, the argument goes, he will
stop smoking. If someone knows that she will be denied bypass sur-
gery if she is obese or has not exercised regularly, the argument
continues, she will lose weight and begin an exercise regimen. If
someone knows that health care is generally not available for HIV
related conditions, the argument concludes, he will avoid intrave-
nous drug use, and homosexual sex (and, perhaps, heterosexual
sex).
In fact, there is no evidence that these kinds of incentives are of
any value. It is hard to believe that the added cost of health care, or
the risk that it will not be available, will add much to the deterrence
value of the health risk itself. Lost health care coverage simply
comes too late to be an effective deterrent, and, as a general matter,
its consequences are too insignificant to add anything to the incen-
tive of good health itself.50 If the risk of death from lung and car-
49. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 939-40 (Ist ed. 1978)
(raising the issue of where the appropriate level of government intervention into private lives
should be drawn).
50. In applying deterrence theory to criminal behavior it has been asserted that "an
individual will engage in proscribed conduct as long as the 'perception of the possibility that
he... will suffer a sanction' is less that the 'expected private benefit' provided by that con-
duct." Thus, deterrence as a theory applied to life style choices, ranging from criminal activ-
ity to diet and health care, presumes that people engage in cost-benefit analysis before they
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diovascular disease does not discourage a person from smoking, it is
hard to believe that the cost or availability of treatment for these
conditions will make a difference. For those who participate in be-
havior that puts them at risk of HIV infection, the nature of the
health care available for that disease five or ten years hence is sim-
ply too removed to be a meaningful deterrent.
The argument that the absence of good health care for a disease
leads people to avoid the risk factors of that disease also suggests
that making health care more available for particular diseases will
encourage people to run the risks of those diseases. The develop-
ment of new and widely available techniques for treating heart dis-
ease has not encouraged people to engage in behavior that puts their
heart at risk, however."1 The attention this medical care has
brought to the health risk has resulted in healthier behavior - pre-
sumably the result of greater knowledge of and concern about the
health consequences of the behavior. Needle exchange programs do
not lead to an increase in the number of people who use drugs; they
have simply made it safer for those who already do so. 2 There
simply is no example of a health status that has become more com-
act. See A. Morgan Cloud, Cocaine Demand and Addiction: A study of the Possible Conver-
gence of Rational Theory and National Policy, 42 VAND. L. REv. 725, 767 (1989).
The courts have recognized this principle in malpractice cases where the defense of com-
parative or contributory negligence of the patient is based upon the patient's unhealthy lifes-
tyle and the resultant need for medical treatment. For example, in Ostrowski v. Azzara, 545
A.2d 148, 150 (N.J. 1988), the doctor alleged that the diabetic plaintiff had smoked cigarettes
and had failed to maintain her weight, diet, and blood sugar at acceptable levels. The
Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the trial court decision allowing this evidence of pre-
treatment health habits to go to the jury on the issue of causation. See also Sawka v. Proko-
powycz, 306 N.W.2d 354 (Ct. App. Mich. 1981), where the court determined that smoking
did not constitute contributory negligence in an action for failure to diagnose lung cancer,
and Jensen v. Archbishop Bergen Mercy Hospital, 459 N.W.2d 178. 187 (Neb. 1990), where
the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the failure to lose weight was not contributory
negligence in an action for malpractice for treatment of the embolism, even though the failure
to lose weight may have been causally related to the creation of the embolism. But see
Musachia v. Rosman, 190 So. 2d 47 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966). For an analysis of these cases, see
Madelynn R. Orr, Comment, Defense of Patients' Contribution to Fault and Medical Mal-
practice Actions, 25 CREIGHTON L. REv. 665 (1992). Of course, deterrence is not the only
reason for the existence of the criminal law or tort law.
51. The death rate from major cardiovascular disease in the United States has fallen
from 510 per 100,000 population in 1950 (its peak) to 410 per 100,000 in 1985 to 366 per
100,000 in 1990. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL CENTER
FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, MORTALITY: DEATH RATES FOR SELECTED CAUSES, 1992 IN-
FORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC ATLAS & YEARBOOK 1992 814 (1992). See also P. Gunby,
Cardiovascular Disease Remains Nation's Leading Cause of Death, 267 JAMA 335 (1992).
52. See Philip J. Hilts, AIDS Panel Backs Efforts to Exchange Drug Users' Needles, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 1991, at Al. For an interesting perspective in the variety of needle exchange
programs, see Arnold S. Trebach, Lessons From Needle Park, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1992, at
A 17 (discussing why some needle exchange programs are more effective than others).
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mon because it has become more successfully treatable. Indeed, in
some cases the result of this deterrent approach, which would pro-
vide treatment for those who did not cause their own health status
but deny it to those who did, is nothing more that to drive under-
ground the behavior or life style choice that created the problem. 3
Where the deterrent is not the denial of treatment, but rather, a
surcharge on current health coverage costs, this consequence is
likely to be exacerbated. One result of driving this behavior under-
ground is that education and health promotion campaigns - which
may effectively deter unhealthy conduct - cannot reach those with
the greatest need.
The use of a higher charge for medical coverage for those who
have voluntarily put their health at risk, and denial of health care
for voluntarily acquired illnesses or injuries, is not likely to provide
much of an incentive to engage in healthier behavior. These deter-
rents add little to the fear of the adverse health outcome and, in
fact, they may undercut the success of health education, which is
more likely to be of value. In any case, there is no reason to believe
that they would be as effective as incentives as other more direct
approaches - including paying people to stop smoking, making
physical fitness activities more available to people where they work
and live, and assuring that cars are equipped with adequate safety
devices.
B. Punishment
The second argument for imposing the burden of voluntary
health risks on those who create them is based in the notion of re-
tributive justice. There are two parts to this argument - the first is
that voluntarily acquiring illness or injury is punishable conduct,
and the second is that the limitation of access to health care is an
appropriate form of punishment.
Illness and injury are evidence of immorality, the argument
goes, because we are the stewards of our own bodies, and it is im-
moral in some fundamental way for any person to despoil the body
he has been given.5" This is a moral responsibility recognized, for
example, in the Bible: Do you not know that you are a temple of
God, and that the Spirit of God dwells in you? If any man destroys
the temple of God, God will destroy him, for the temple of God is
53. See Trebach, supra note 52.
54. See Sedgwick, supra note 37, and the accompanying text.
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holy, and that is what you are."
It is, of course, recognized in entirely nonreligious literature
also. To the extent this unhealthy state is caused by voluntary con-
duct, it is as subject to punishment as any other culpable conduct.
On the other hand, this ancient and new age sense of moral culpa-
bility for one's health status runs counter to another development
over the past thirty years; for the most part we have stopped treat-
ing health status as criminal. Private drunkenness cannot be crimi-
nal,56 being addicted to narcotics cannot be criminal5 7 and we no
longer bring attempted suicides to the police station and book them
as soon as they are stabilized (although, until the 1950s, this was
common).58
There can be little doubt that the deprivation of adequate health
care is viewed as an appropriate part of criminal punishment, even
when the underlying culpable conduct is not health related. The
deplorable condition of our prison health systems is one way in
which the morally culpable are provided with much lower quality
medical care than the righteous majority.59 The practice of provid-
ing virtually unlimited resources to treat innocent newborns, the
only fully nonculpable among us, also suggests that moral status is a
relevant consideration in the distribution of health care resources. 6°
Of course, there are problems in using the availability of health
care as a punishment, whether for health-related quasi-crimes or for
55. 1 Cor. 3:16-17 (New American Standard Bible). A few chapters later in the same
book includes a somewhat softer exhortation:
Or do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit who is in you,
whom you have from God, and that you are not your own? For you have been
bought with a price; therefore glorify God in your body.
1 Cor. 6:19-20 (New American Standard Bible). See also Gerald J. Gruman, Death and Dy-
ing: Euthanasia and Sustaining Life - Historical Perspectives, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BIOETHIcS 261 (Warren T. Reich, ed., 1978).
56. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). Although Justice Marshall, writing for a
plurality, declined to find the Texas statute that criminalized public drunkenness unconstitu-
tional, he emphasized that the Texas court's conviction was for a public, not a private, act.
57. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that a California statute which
made it punishable for any person to be addicted to the use of narcotics cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment).
58. For a good history of the legal treatment of suicide, see GEORGE PATRICK SMITH,
FINAL CHOICES: AUTONOMY IN HEALTH CARE DECISIONS (1989).
59. See B. Jaye Anno, The Role of Organized Medicine in Correctional Health Care, 247
JAMA 2923 (1982), and Iris F. Litt & Michael I. Cohen, Prisons, Adolescents and the Right
to Quality Medical Care: The Time is Now, 64 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 894 (1974). See also
Andrew Skolnick, Government Issues Guidelines to Stem Rising Tuberculosis Rates in Prisons,
262 JAMA 3249 (1989).
60. Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment, 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (1991).
See also Iafelice v. Zarafa, 534 A.2d 417 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1987).
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other misdeeds. We do not deny any other necessities to those who
have committed crimes; why should this necessity be denied to
those who have not? Is the denial of treatment that is necessary to
preserve life (or to make it more bearable) proportional to the im-
moral conduct? Are isolation and hastened death the right punish-
ment for intravenous drug use or unprotected homosexual sex?
Heterosexual sex? Would you impose a penalty on either? Would
you impose the same penalty on both? Is death at the side of the
highway, while the paramedics look on, the proper punishment for
failure to wear a seat belt or a motorcycle helmet? Is the decision to
deny affordable health care coverage to a family the proper punish-
ment for a smoking employee? What, exactly, is the proper punish-
ment for choosing to live outside of Utah?
If punishment is a justifiable reason for denying care to those
who have created the need for medical care as a result of their vol-
untary conduct, we will have to develop a quasi-criminal system to
define medical quasi-crimes and their appropriate punishments.
Someone will have to define these quasi-crimes and determine when
risks to health are justified by other concerns. In fact, some high
risk activities seem to bring little moral condemnation in this soci-
ety, and others are almost universally condemned. High risk activi-
ties of the rich and famous - skiing, high stress life styles, flying
private planes, scuba diving - seem acceptable. High risk activities
of the poor - smoking, overeating, drinking - seem to be morally
unacceptable. We can presume that invidious discrimination that
affects the rest of the health care system will also have an affect on
the description and punishment of culpable health states. If race
and gender seem to play some subtle role in the selection of liver
transplant candidates when those attributes are formally irrele-
vant,61 and if they play a very substantial role in the selection of
bypass surgery candidates,6 2 we should expect that they will play
some role in determining those who are morally qualified to receive
health care.
61. See Cohen & Benjamin, supra note 8. See also Phillip J. Held et al., Access to Kidney
Transplantation; Has the United States Eliminated Income and Racial Differences?, 148
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2594 (1988).
62. Indeed, race seems to play a significant role in determining access to a whole range
of medical interventions, from primary care through tertiary care. For a summary and ac-
count of the role in determining who has access to care, see Durado D. Brooks et al., Medical
Apartheid: An American Perspective, 266 JAMA 2746 (1991). See also Stepan G. Rostand et
al., Racial Differences in the Incidence of treatment for End-Stage Renal Disease, 306 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1276 (1982), and Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Black-White Dispari-
ties in Health Care, 263 JAMA 2344 (1990).
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In the end, defining health conditions that deserve punishment,
and prescribing health-related punishments for those conditions, is
unlikely to be done in a way that fairly will serve the underlying
purposes of punishment in this society.
C. The Equitable Distribution of Health Resources
Probably the most often expressed and politically expedient rea-
son for imposing the cost burden of voluntary health risks on those
whose conduct gave rise to the risks is that it more equitably distrib-
utes scarce health resources by more equitably distributing their
costs. It is only fair that a person who creates a health risk should
have to pay for it. After all, people who choose to wear fancy
clothes, drive fast cars, attend expensive colleges or influence im-
portant state legislators pay more for their pleasure; they pay more
to get more. Those who choose to live in a way that requires the
expenditure of additional health care resources ought to pay more
because they are getting more.
While it is fair for society to pool its resources to pay for chance
occurrences that afflict its members, it hardly seems fair to require
those who take steps to avoid illness and injury to subsidize those
who voluntarily undertake the risk of illness and injury. Those who
choose to run health risks cost the rest of us money, and they
should pay it back - either by paying larger health insurance pre-
miums, or forgoing health care for their self-induced conditions.
Of course, these assertions presume that those with unhealthy
life styles actually do cost us money and this attempt to shift costs
to them is not simply an attempt to blame the increasing costs of
health care on those with offensive looks or unpopular habits. In
fact, there is good reason to believe that, at the very least, people
with some unhealthy life styles actually save us much more than
they cost. One unreleased 1971 British government study evaluated
the financial consequences of imposing a large enough excise tax on
cigarettes to substantially reduce smoking - one of the most so-
cially unacceptable life styles.63 The simplistic notion that former
smokers would be healthier and require less care from the national
health service proved true - to a point. At first, there would be an
improvement in health status and health care resources would be
preserved. But non-smokers get sick and die, too, and while they
may live longer than smokers (on the average), there is no evidence
63. Howard Leichter, Public Policy and the British Experience, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Oct. 1982 at 32, 36-38.
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that their final illnesses are less expensive than the final illnesses of
smokers. While there is an initial savings, there is a substantial ad-
ditional long term cost that arises out of the increase in the number
of elderly patients and their delayed illnesses. The British study
suggested that a twenty percent fall in smoking would save four
million pounds (based on 1971 prices) ten years after it was put into
effect, but would cost an additional two million pounds after thirty
years. 64
In addition, smoking may save society money in a host of other
ways. The years smoking takes off of one's life always come off the
back end; indeed, smoking leads to disease that is likely to cause
death around the time the smoker ends her working life and about
the time she begins retirement. The additional social security costs
required to support a non-smoking society would be enormous;
even in the short run they would probably exceed the financial sav-
ings provided to the health care system. In the United States the
consequences of a dramatic reduction in smoking without an ac-
companying change in the age of retirement could include bank-
ruptcy of the social security system, a politically unbearable
increase in the cost of the Medicare program, and the failure of
many retirement plans. Because much long term care for the eld-
erly is provided through state Medicaid programs, that state expen-
diture, which is already the fastest growing item in most state
budgets, would grow even faster if people were living longer. This
64. Id. at 36. There would be a substantially greater differential if there were a 40% fall
in smoking. That would save 16 million pounds over a decade, but cost the British govern-
ment 29 million pounds (still in 1971 pounds) after 30 years. The 29 million pound addi-
tional cost reflects a net increase in social security payments of 24 million pounds. The
relative change in the cost of health care and social security associated with 20% and 40%
falls in cigarette smoking are indicated in the following chart.
Estimated Changes in Health Care and Social Security
Expenditure (based upon 1971 prices)
Fall in cigarette Net change in Net change in Net overall
smoking health care social security change
costs payments (L million)
20 percent fall
1981 -4 -4 -8
1991 -4 +1 -3
2001 +2 +10 +12
40 percent fall
1981 -7 -9 -16
1991 -1 +5 +4
2001 +5 +24 +29
SOURCE: Cigarette Smoking and Health, Report by an
Interdepartmental Group of Officials, London: October 1971.
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would require either additional tax revenue or a further decrease in
the availability of health services to the non-elderly poor.
As the British study points out, there are further financial conse-
quences of a decrease in smoking. A decrease in smoking (which
would decrease tax revenue derived from cigarettes, of course)
would be accompanied by an increase in the purchase of other
goods, many of which would be imported. This would lead to a
further trade imbalance. If smoking were reduced by the imposi-
tion of an additional tax on cigarettes, the tax revenue from that
source could remain stable, but the consumer price index would go
up, and that would require additional government expenditures.65
It isn't surprising that the British analysis of this issue looked
primarily to government costs, which include social security pay-
ments and costs incurred by the national health care system. Any
analysis of the cost of smoking in the United States would be more
complex. The only attempt to do this analysis looked at the exter-
nal costs of smoking - those costs born by the society and not the
smoker - in order to determine whether the current taxes on
smoking were economically efficient. 66 The external costs consid-
ered in the study were derived from collectively financed programs,
including health insurance, pensions, sick leave, disability insur-
ance, and group life insurance. The study separately considered
such external costs as property loss from fires associated with ciga-
rette smoking and employer-paid sick leave occasioned by cigarette
smoking.
The study found that "each pack of cigarettes increases medical
costs by thirty eight cents, but saved one dollar and eighty two cents
in public and private pensions... Over all there is a net savings of
ninety one cents per pack in undiscounted costs."' 67 If all costs are
discounted at five percent, there is a net external cost per pack of
about fifteen cents, considering both medical cost savings and the
pension cost reduction. 6 As the study points out, "our estimate of
the external cost of smoking, fifteen cents per pack, is well below
the current average (state plus federal) excise and sales taxes of
thirty seven cents per pack."' 69 Only if lives lost to passive smoking
and fires are included as external costs does the external cost of
65. Id. at 36-38.
66. Willard G. Manning et al., The Taxes of Sin; Do Smokers and Drinkers Pay Their
Way?, 261 JAMA 1604 (1989).
67. Id. at 1606.
68. Id. at 1606-07.
69. Id. at 1608.
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smoking approach the current tax on a per-pack basis.7"
While this American study was designed to evaluate tax policy,
not the imposition of other burdens on smokers, it suggests that
smokers already bear a financial burden that compensates for any
they impose upon the rest of society. Of course, this conclusion is
based upon several variously supported assumptions about retire-
ment age of smokers and non-smokers, other health habits of smok-
ers, the under reporting of smoking, the discount rate on pensions
and other costs, the distribution of external and internal costs, and
the value of life, which was set at one million, sixty six thousand
dollars, or about ten dollars per hour.7"
In other words, smokers do not cost the rest of us money; in
fact, they save us money. If fairness were to require that smokers be
charged more for health insurance than non-smokers, then fairness
also requires that non-smokers be charged more for social security
and make larger contributions to retirement plans. Similarly, those
with unhealthy eating habits or inadequate exercise habits may be
the patriots who are saving our social security system and keeping
the Medicare tax contribution financing scheme effective and politi-
cally acceptable.
70. Id. at 1605, 1607. An interesting summary of the consequences of alternative dis-
count rates on the net external cost of smoking is provided in a table included in the publica-
tion of this study:
Table 2: External Costs per Pack of Cigarettes*
Discount Rate
External Costs 0% 5% 10%
Costs per pack S
Medical care" 0.38 0.26 0.18
Sick Leave 0.01 0.01 0.01
Group life insurance 0.11 0.05 0.02
Nursing Home -0.26 -0.03 0.00
Retirement Pension*** -1.82 -0.24 -0.02
Fires 0.02 0.02 0.02
Taxes in earnings to finance
above programs S -0.65 -0.09 -0.02
Total net costs per pack S § -0.91 0.15 0.24
Life expectancy at age 20 y
per pack, mi -137 -28 -6
* The number of packs of cigarettes are corrected for underreporting.
Costs (in 1986 dollars) per pack are calculated by dividing by the dis-
counted number of packs smoked.
** Includes all but maternity, well, and dental care.
* Includes disability insurance.
§ The sum of costs minus taxes on earnings, e.g., costs at 5% equals 0.15
- 0.26 + 0.01 + 0.05 - 0.03 - 0.24 + 0.02 - (-0.09).
71. Id. at 1607-09 (concluding that the taxes on liquor do not come close to paying the
external costs that the use of liquor imposes on society. Of course, this conclusion is based on
another series of rather arbitrary assumptions).
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While it is unclear that others with different unhealthy life styles
provide the rest of us with a subsidy, as smokers do, it is hardly
clear that they cost us anything as a consequence of their habits.
Whether helmetless motorcyclists are imposing a financial burden
on the rest of us by engaging in their risky behavior depends upon
which stereotypical view of this subgroup of motorcyclists is closer
to the truth; are they healthy young people entering their working
prime, or ne'er-do-wells who are unlikely ever to contribute to
society?
Of course, there may be some kinds of choices that clearly im-
pose a cost on society - the failure to wear seat belts, perhaps.
However, the principle that costs should be equitably distributed
would not permit imposing an additional cost on those who engage
in this probably costly behavior without also imposing an additional
cost on those who engage in other probably costly behaviors like
driving (rather than walking) to work or skiing or not smoking -
behaviors unlikely to be made the subject of any sanctions.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to assess which health related life style choices are
truly voluntary; in fact, it is a mistake to ask that question as if
there were an unambiguous answer in any case. While some behav-
iors are more voluntary than others, most are a consequence of a
combination of voluntary action and genetic predisposition, ethnic
background, wealth, geographic location, and a host of other fac-
tors. Even if we could assess the voluntariness of health related
behavior, we should not impose the cost of its consequences upon
the actor unless we can conclude with some certainty that the un-
happy result was actually caused by the identified behavior. How-
ever, causation is as ambiguous and as difficult to establish as is the
element of voluntariness. Finally, we ought not impose the cost of
health consequences actually caused by voluntary conduct on the
person who decided to run the risk of the consequence if the risk
was justified by a countervailing social interest. Whether there is a
countervailing social interest is also marked by uncertainty, ambi-
guity and ambivalence in most cases.
Even if we could identify some truly voluntary conduct that
were clearly and causally connected to some adverse health condi-
tion, and even if we could conclude that this conduct were not
otherwise socially justified, we could not base an argument for im-
posing the cost of the conduct - whether it be by denying access to
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health care for that condition, by giving lower priority to that
health care claimant, or by charging that person a higher premium
for health insurance - on any of the three bases usually advanced
to justify that result: deterrence, punishment, and the equitable dis-
tribution of resources. This form of incentive is not likely to deter
the unhealthy life style choices to which it may be applied; it will
unfairly and improperly punish those who are not deserving of pun-
ishment, and it will do so without any regard for a sense of propor-
tionality; and, finally, it will not lead to the equitable distribution of
scare societal resources.
In fact, the recent call to impose the costs of health care on
those who voluntarily create risks that result in those costs is a way
to blame patients for the increase in health care costs. It is a way to
avoid dealing with the real reason for the rise in those costs - rea-
sons that include an irrationally structured health care delivery sys-
tem and a highly subsidized market that can command almost any
amount of resources.72
It is hardly surprising that the punish-the-smoker mentality sur-
faced first in England and Canada when the costs of those central-
ized health care systems began to rise precipitously in the 1970s.73
It is not surprising that the same mentality has arisen in this coun-
try at the same time that smoking, consuming a diet high is satu-
rated fats, driving without a seat belt, and several other unhealthy
life styles are on the decline. We should not allow ourselves to be
drawn away from serious evaluation of the justice of our health care
system by focusing on the life style of patients. We should not be
diverted from dealing with patient and community education and
other proven ways of promoting and encouraging good health
(which is certainly a valuable social end, even if it costs money) by
figuring out how to impose sentence on those with life style related
health problems. Even is we could, we ought not make patients pay
for their life style choices.
72. See Barry Furrow et al., supra note 1, at 661-66.
73. See Leichter, supra note 63.

